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Abstract 
We introduce ideas about how coercion in public finance can be formally defined, building on 
recent work in the literature. Our discussion illustrates the connection between selected aspects of 
this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and 
Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of 
coercion in a public finance setting. We use a Lindahl solution as the counterfactual social state 
relative to which coercion inherent in any situation is to be judged in order to evaluate and compare 
the nature of coercion imposed by a social planner and in an electoral equilibrium. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce some ideas about coercion in public finance using recent work in the 
literature as a foundation, while briefly illustrating the connection between selected aspects of this 
research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and Tullock. 
We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of coercion in 
a public finance setting.  
 Coercion in public finance arises from two essential sources: (i) external control of 
individuals and that of the country exercised through threats of violence and sanctions; and (ii) as 
a by-product of the compromises that citizens must agree to in a democratic society. In this chapter 
we focus on the second source or type of coercion, assuming that the fiscal systems we consider 
are compatible with a stable democratic society in which the state has a legitimate and 
constitutionally circumscribed monopoly on violence.1 This assumption is of course a big one. 
Nonetheless, as we hope will become clear in what follows, important issues of definition and 
analysis still remain before a full understanding of the nature of coercion in modern fiscal systems 
can be achieved.  
 To fix ideas, it is useful to begin with an example that we have used in earlier work (Winer, 
Tridimas and Hettich 2014, hereafter WTH 2014). Consider a sizeable group of citizens who have 
come together in a room for a common purpose and who must collectively set the temperature on 
a thermostat and pay for the resulting use of energy. Inevitably in such a group, some people will 
be too hot and some too cold, and even those for whom the temperature is just right may be 
unhappy with the balance they face between what they pay and what they get. Individuals can 
                                                        
1 This and the next section make use of some ideas from Martinez-Vazquez and Winer, eds. (2014) and Winer Tridimas 
and Hettich (2014). For exploration of the connections between the two fundamental sources of coercion and the 
implications of this relationship for public finance from differing points of view, see Skaperdas (2014) and Wallis 
(2014).   
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escape this situation if they move rooms or leave the building that represents the collectivity in the 
example. But if they stay, they must cope with the coercion implied by their assent to the 
collectively made decision. Coercion for any individual in this example - roughly speaking, the 
difference between what they get and what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-price that they 
have to pay -  cannot be avoided whatever practical collective choice process is used.  
 Fiscal coercion of this kind, which arises naturally in all liberal democratic societies, is one 
of the foundations of what is perhaps the most famous diagram in Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus 
of Consent (1962, fig 3, p.71). This diagram endogenizes the constitutional choice of a decision 
rule for the making of fiscal and other decisions as the outcome of minimization of the sum of two 
types of costs: expected external costs that fall with the proportion of citizens required for a 
decision to be taken; and expected decision-making costs that rise with this proportion. As they 
also argue, there is no obvious reason why the optimal, cost-minimizing solution should require a 
simple majority.  
 'External costs' in the Calculus of Consent are the equivalent of coercion in our stylized 
example, though they are not referred to as such in the book. Despite the centrality of coercion to 
the Calculus, an exact definition of coercion is not provided nor has it been in their subsequent 
work. More generally, while philosophers and legal experts have explored its nature at length, 
work on coercion in economics has lagged behind that in other disciplines even though a concern 
with it often lies beneath the surface, especially when taxation is involved.  
 The exception in economics is the literature on mechanism design, recently reviewed by 
Ledyard (2014), which is built on the early work of Wicksell (1896) and his student Lindahl 
(1919). The early work was aimed at establishing a fiscal system with public goods that is 
economically efficient while at the same time minimizing (Wicksell), or even eliminating 
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(Lindahl) fiscal coercion. In the mechanism design literature, the objective is similar to that of 
Lindahl's, with participation constraints formally requiring that all equilibria or solutions involve 
the absence of coercion. Whether such a solution with public goods is possible, and how one may 
be achieved under alternative assumptions about what citizens know about each other's 'type' 
remains an active area of research.   
 In the next section we briefly summarize our understanding of how fiscal coercion may be 
formally defined and used in fiscal analysis when citizens are constrained to remain in the room, 
so to speak, based on our earlier work. That exit from the community is prevented (or prohibitively 
costly) is a second important underlying assumption of the present analysis. We then develop an 
alternative definition of coercion in section three that aims at insuring the aggregate compatibility 
of individual views about coercion when individual tastes for public goods and individual incomes 
are both heterogeneous as well as correlated, and we explore some of its implications for fiscal 
analysis.       
 
2. The individual-in-society, the individual-as-dictator and imposition of  coercion 
 constraints in a social planning problem 
 
A formal definition of fiscal coercion for an individual requires that a counterfactual be defined, 
so that an actual situation in which a taxpayer finds himself can be compared to one that the 
individual regards as non-coercive.2  This counterfactual may be one in which the individual 
receives in public services what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-price that must be paid, a 
formulation of the counterfactual implicitly used in the example stated earlier, or, analogously, 
one in which he or she pays what they think is appropriate for the public services actually provided. 
The former approach is the one used by Breton (1996) and is implicit, we think, in work by                                                         
2  'Non-coercive' does not necessarily mean that same thing as 'voluntary'. For a deeper discussion of related issues 
in the definition of coercion, see Congleton (2014).   
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Buchanan, for example in his Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1968, 145-146) in which he 
stresses the importance of the individual's recognition that he or she is part of a social situation. It 
is the approach used in WTH (2014). Adoption of a counterfactual in which the individual pays 
what he thinks is appropriate for the services actually received is suggested by the work of Lindahl, 
and is the counterfactual experiment embodied in the computable equilibrium study of fiscal 
coercion in the U.S. state of Georgia by Sehili and Martinez-Vazquez (2014).  
 Both of these approaches are part of what we have referred to as individual-in-society 
definitions. To formalize the approach in which the individual takes as given the socially 
determined tax rate  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , let 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗ be the maximized utility that a citizen enjoys under specified 
counterfactual conditions, and 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 be the utility he or she actually enjoys from the operation of the 
public sector. In this individual-in-society approach to defining coercion, the individual determines 
the level of public good G* that maximizes her utility subject to income 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 that may be a function 
of the tax rate. Coercion is then defined as the difference between the resulting counterfactual 
utility and the utility conferred by the actual fiscal system:  
 [𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖∗,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖],     where 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖∗ = argmax 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(𝐺𝐺,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)    (1) 
               { 𝐺𝐺 } 
 
 A second approach begins with the assumption that appropriate treatment of an individual 
by the fiscal system is what that person would want if he or she was a dictator. This is the 
individual-as-dictator approach, first suggested by Usher.3 Coercion is then calculated as the 
difference between utility with the 'dictator's' preferred outcome and the actual utility experienced 
in the world as it is. In a simple version of this approach, the individual–as–dictator with income  
                                                        
3 Personal communication from Dan Usher.  
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 determines a proportional tax rate t and the level of the public good G by maximizing utility  
subject to the government budget constraint ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺, where 𝑁𝑁 denotes the number of 
taxpayers. Coercion is calculated as:  [𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗(𝐺𝐺∗,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡∗) − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖],  where 𝐺𝐺∗ = argmax 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗(𝐺𝐺,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 )    (2) 
            { 𝐺𝐺 } 
 
Hintermann and Rutherford (2017) use this individual-as-dictator definition in a computable 
general equilibrium model to analyse coercion in their study of environmental policy.4  
 An additional issue to be decided using either of the two approaches outlined is whether 
only citizens who lose relative to the counterfactual are to be considered coerced, or whether, as 
in WTH 2014, all citizens for whom the differentials above are non-zero are to be included in the 
measure of coercion.  
2.1  Coercion constrained optimal policy 
A society interested in liberty will set limits on the coercion that can be imposed on its individual 
members by the state. Studying the implication of such limits is therefore of interest, and doing so 
is easier if there are analytically tractable definitions of coercion like those illustrated above. This 
brings us to the question of whether to apply coercion constraints at the level of the individual, or 
at some aggregate level.  
 In accordance with Wicksell, who advocated approximate unanimity among groups as a 
way of minimizing coercion, a constraint involving individuals or groups may be specified as 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  ,         (3) 
where the subscript refers to individuals or to specific social groups.  
 A more relaxed approach that allows for stronger policy judgments, and a greater degree  
                                                        4 It may be noted that a median voter is essentially a dictator imposing coercion on everyone else.  
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of coercion in whatever allocation emerges, bears some similarity to the Kaldor–Hicks criterion 
for potential compensation (in contrast to the strict Pareto criterion). This involves the use of a 
constraint on the sum of individual utility differences, such as  
 ∑ (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖)  ≤ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  .        (4) 
 A social planning problem with a simple fiscal system and coercion constraints can be 
written as follows, where F is the social objective:  
 Max 𝐹𝐹�𝑉𝑉1( 𝑌𝑌1, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺), … ,𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛( 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺)�      (5)  
such that    ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺   and   {𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,∀ 𝑖𝑖     or     ∑ (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖)  ≤ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 }. It may be noted that when an individual-in-society definition of the coercion is used to define the counterfactual, the degree of coercion is endogenous in this problem since the planner must observe coercion constraints, which affects the choice of fiscal instruments and so the nature of coercion in the solution. On the other hand, if an individual-as-dictator approach is 
used, the counterfactual depends only on preferences, technology and endowments, and is 
therefore independent of the planner's objective. 
 It is also interesting to note, as Munger (2014) points out, that Coasian (1960) bargaining 
solves the problem with individual constraints, while economizing on the government's or the 
planner's need to know anything about individual preferences or about what levels of coercion are 
acceptable to the parties involved.5 
 Imposing coercion constraints on a social planning problem is one way of investigating the 
implications of limitations on coercion for the nature of optimal fiscal systems. This procedure is 
similar to imposing equity constraints in an inquiry about the kind of tax system that is best suited 
                                                        
5 The issues involved in determining the practicality of Coasian bargaining are well known and will not be enumerated 
here.   
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to achieving an equitable tax burden. Indeed, investigations of these kinds may be regarded as 
complements in the present context. For Wicksell knowingly avoided the equity problem in his 
seminal pursuit of a fiscal system that is simultaneously efficient and coercion-minimizing, by 
assuming at the outset that the problem of distribution had somehow been solved before the 
legislature acted. Whether the related problems of coercion and of equity in tax design should be 
tackled simultaneously or in some specific sequence is an open and longstanding question.  
 Any sort of constraint, whether directed at equity or coercion that is imposed on an 
optimizing planner will reduce social welfare (Kaplow, 2001). From a social planning point of 
view, this issue could be dealt with by folding coercion constraints and equity constraints into a 
social welfare function, leading then to an efficient or socially optimal degree of coercion and to 
an efficient degree of inequity. However, doing so may not be the best way to proceed if the 
concerns behind these constraints serve broad social objectives that are not clearly subsumed by 
the usual utilitarian approach to public finance.  
 
3. An individual-as-planner definition of coercion and some of its implications.  
A potential problem with both the individual–in–society and individual–as–dictator definitions is 
that in the counterfactual, each individual desires a different fiscal mix. With individuals having 
different incomes and tastes for the public good, the desired levels of the fiscal instruments are 
almost surely inconsistent with each other in the aggregate. This inconsistency suggests that an 
analysis based on such definitions of coercion contain within them an element of social instability. 
 For this reason, we introduce a third definition of coercion, the difference between 
individual utility in a Lindahl equilibrium and the actual utility conferred by the prevailing fiscal 
mix. This is an example of an individual-as-planner approach to the definition of coercion  
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suggested by Boadway (2014). In a Lindahl solution, there is no coercion and all decisions are  
mutually consistent. In this section we specify a simple Lindahl-like equilibrium in which all 
citizens must contribute, and then use this as basis for defining coercion and comparing its nature 
in an optimal tax system and in an electoral equilibrium. In this investigation, individuals are 
heterogeneous; they differ in their (exogenously defined) incomes, tastes for a single pure public 
good, and in their degree of political influence.    
 We begin this comparative analysis with the specification of a simple fiscal system. 
Assume there is a society of 𝑁𝑁 citizen–taxpayers indexed by 𝑖𝑖. Each individual maximizes a Cobb–
Douglas utility function defined over private consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and a public good 𝐺𝐺, has an 
(exogenous) income 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and pays a proportional income tax at rate 𝑡𝑡. Thus,  
 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺 , where  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖   (6) 
Here the parameter 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∈ [𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚,𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀], 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚,𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀 < 1, denotes the intensity of 
taste for the public good of each citizen-taxpayer, and has mean 𝛼𝛼� = ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
.  
 Normalizing the unit price of the public good to unity, the budget constraint of the 
government is 
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺.         (7) 
 We note that along with the stability of fiscal institutions and the costliness of exit from 
the community, the exogeneity of incomes is a third major assumption of our analysis.   
3.1 A Lindahl-like solution 
If coercion is to be eliminated in the Lindahl solution, each person must face a personalized price 
for the public good, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, such that  ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  and such that each person optimizes their own welfare 
at that tax-price with exactly the same level of the public good provided to everyone.   
 Each individual maximizes their utility (6) subject to their Lindahl budget constraint     
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𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  , leading to the reduced form utility function 
 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺) + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺 .     (8) 
Maximization of (7) with respect to 𝐺𝐺 gives 𝐺𝐺 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
 , the size of the public good that 𝑖𝑖 prefers at 
the tax-price 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 . Inverting the latter yields the condition that defines the maximum non-coercive 
tax-price (the demand price) at which every citizen is content with the same, utility maximizing 
level of the public good, that is,   𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  .  
 Now let the covariance between citizen income 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and taste for the public good 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 be 
written as   
 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 − ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁  ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁  ,         
where if the rich have less (more) intense tastes for the public good than the poor,  𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 < (>) 0. 
Then using the condition  ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  (tax-prices sum to 1) and the covariance formula, it can be 
seen that size of the public good in the Lindahl solution 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 has the general form   
 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿  =  𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 ).                                                               (9) 
In view of (9), each individual pays a Lindahl tax of 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. 6 
 Substitution of (9) into (6) gives the indirect utility of individual 𝑖𝑖 in the Lindahl solution 
that we shall use in our comparison of coercion in the optimal tax and electoral equilibrium 
situations described below:    
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁(𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 ).    (10) 
 Before proceeding, it is of interest to derive the analogue to the formula in Buchanan (1964) 
that shows when the Lindahl tax share will rise, remain constant, or fall with income - that is, be                                                         6 We may use the latter to calculate an economy-wide average income tax rate as follows. Funding 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿  requires a tax 
revenue of 𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 which implies that the notional tax rate is  𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼� + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝑌𝑌�  . However, this is not the actual rate 
levied on taxpayers in a Lindahl solution. Each individual pays a personalized tax tailored to their preferences.  
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progressive, proportional or regressive with respect to income.7  Given 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
 , it can be seen 
that  𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺
𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
= 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
1
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
1
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
−  𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
1
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
 . Since in a Lindahl equilibrium 𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
= 0 , because everyone 
demands the same level of 𝐺𝐺, we can multiply through by 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 to put this in elasticity form. Thus we 
can write: 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
 = 1 +  𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
 . In words, in the Lindahl solution, we have that the elasticity of the 
tax share with respect to income = 1 + the elasticity of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 with respect to income. Thus if the latter 
elasticity is greater than 0, the Lindahl tax price schedule (if we can think of it as such) will be 
progressive in our model economy. 
3.2 The optimal tax solution 
In the traditional social planner or optimal tax approach (OT), the government sets the proportional 
tax rate in (7) at a level that is completely unconstrained by the coercive character of its actions, 
maximizing a social welfare function that we assume is the unweighted sum of individual utilities: 
 𝑆𝑆 = ∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖             (11) 
 Maximizing S with respect to 𝐺𝐺 and using (7), we obtain the social welfare maximizing 
size of the public good, and the corresponding proportional tax rate:  
 𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂  =  𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝛼𝛼�   and 𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂  =  𝛼𝛼� .                                               (12) 
The indirect utility of citizen-voter 𝑖𝑖 in this optimal tax scheme then can be stated as  
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝛼𝛼 � .     (13) 
3.3 An electoral equilibrium 
Before calculating and comparing coercion levels under social planning and in a political  
                                                        
7 Buchanan (1964) pp. 229-230: “A more general statement of the necessary condition (for a Lindahl solution - our 
addition) is as follows: The income elasticity of demand for the public good divided by the price elasticity of demand 
must be equal to, and opposed in sign to, the income elasticity of the tax-price schedule. Full neutrality is present when 
this condition is met throughout the range of possible incomes.”  
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equilibrium, we must also solve for indirect utility in the electoral equilibrium. When the fiscal 
mix is decided by the outcome of competitive elections, policy outcomes reflect a balancing of the 
heterogeneous economic interests of citizens. This sort of balance can be modeled using a 
probabilistic spatial voting model (see Coughlin 1992, or Mueller 2003). In such a setting, electoral 
equilibrium can be replicated using a Representation Theorem of the sort described by Coughlin 
(1992), by Hettich and Winer (1999) and by others. This involves maximization of a synthetic 
political support function defined over individual indirect utilities, where the weights on each 
citizen's utility reflect their relative political influence in the electoral equilibrium.  
 We proceed assuming that such a representation theorem applies. Let 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 denote the 
normalized relative political influence of citizen 𝑖𝑖 in the electoral equilibrium, so that ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 1. 
Equilibrium values of  𝐺𝐺 and  𝑡𝑡 maximize the support function  
 𝑆𝑆 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  .         (14) 
This support function looks like a social welfare function, but it is not. The weights do not reflect 
a normative view about the distribution of welfare, but rather are determined in the Nash electoral 
equilibrium. In this case, in the version of the theorem used here, the outcome also lies on the 
Pareto frontier, though not the one consistent with the OT solution in which each individual's 
welfare is weighted equally.  
 Let 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2  denote the covariance between citizen influence 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, and taste for the public 
good 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,  
 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 , 
where if those with low (high) 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 have more political influence, then 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 < (>)0. Maximizing  
(14) and using 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2  we obtain the equilibrium fiscal system with one pure public good and a 
proportional tax on income: 
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 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃  =  𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�(𝛼𝛼� + 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 )   and    𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 =   𝛼𝛼� + 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 .    (15) 
Substituting into the utility function (6) leads to the the indirect utility of voter-taxpayer 𝑖𝑖 in this 
electoral equilibrium,  
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 )𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�(𝛼𝛼� + 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ).  (16) 
 
4. Who is coerced, and when? 
We now proceed with an analysis of coercion in OT and in the electoral equilibrium using the 
Lindahl solution as the standard of reference to define coercion in each case. We begin with the 
optimal tax solution.  
4.1 Coercion under the OT social planner  
Comparing (10) and (13), we have 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�) + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� � (17) 
We may say that when 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 > 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 , citizen 𝑖𝑖 is coerced by the social planner. On the other hand, 
when 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 < 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 , citizen 𝑖𝑖 benefits from the coercion forced on the rest of the polity. 
 From (17) we see that the sign of the utility differential  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 depends crucially on  𝛼𝛼� 
relative to 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, and the sign of 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the 
public good. There are three cases to consider, namely, (i) richer citizens have a relatively lower 
taste for the public good; (ii) the opposite case, where richer citizens have a relatively higher taste 
for the public good; and (iii) the case in which income and preferences for the public good are 
independent.  
(i)  When richer citizens have a relatively lower taste for the public good, 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 < 0, in which  
case  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2
𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�
� < 0.  Since for small values of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  we may use the approximation 
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 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) ≈ −𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,  the difference in (18) yields the following quadratic equation 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2 − �1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�)�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�). (18) 
Denoting 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�) ≡ −𝑘𝑘; 𝑘𝑘 > 0   and   𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2
𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�
� ≡ −𝜃𝜃;  𝜃𝜃 > 0 , (18) can be rewritten as  
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2 − (1 + 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑘𝑘)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘.     (18′) 
Solving the latter yields  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 12 �1 + 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑘𝑘 ± 𝜃𝜃�1 + 2(1+𝑘𝑘)𝜃𝜃 + (1−𝑘𝑘)2𝜃𝜃2 � . Using the approximation 
�1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝2 ≈ 1 + 𝑝𝑝
2
𝑝𝑝 + 1
2
�𝑞𝑞 −
𝑝𝑝2
4
� 𝑝𝑝2 we obtain the roots  
 𝛼𝛼1 =  𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1+
𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
2
𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�
�
> 0  and    𝛼𝛼2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�) − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1+
𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
2
𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�
�
 
 Of the above, only the sign of  𝛼𝛼1 is unambiguously positive, but at this level of generality 
we cannot tell whether it is larger or smaller than one. As for  𝛼𝛼2 , we note that neither its sign nor 
its size is unambiguous. We therefore list all possible combinations and the corresponding signs 
of  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂. Figure 1 below illustrates graphically what is involved in each case:  
(a) 𝛼𝛼1 < 1  and  𝛼𝛼1 <  𝛼𝛼2 < 1 .  Then 
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
For  𝛼𝛼1 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 <  𝛼𝛼2  ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  <  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
For  𝛼𝛼2 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 <  1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
 (b) 𝛼𝛼1 < 1  and  𝛼𝛼1 <  1 <  𝛼𝛼2 . Then   
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 <  𝛼𝛼1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
For  𝛼𝛼1 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  <  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
(c) 𝛼𝛼1 > 1  and 𝛼𝛼2 < 0.   Then     
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  <  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
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(d)  𝛼𝛼1 > 1  and 0 < 𝛼𝛼2 < 1 .   Then    
or  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 <   𝛼𝛼2  ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
For   𝛼𝛼2 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⇒ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  <  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
(e)  𝛼𝛼1 > 1  and 𝛼𝛼2 > 1 . Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂. 
 
 
 
(ii)  When rich people have a higher taste for the public good, we have  𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 > 0 . In this case 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2
𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�
� > 0.  Since for small values of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  we may use the approximation 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) ≈ 
−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , the difference in (18) yields the following second order polynomial  
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2 − �1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�)�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�). (19) 
Working as above, the roots of the quadratic equation are 
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 𝛼𝛼1 =  − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1+
𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
2
𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�
�
< 0  and  𝛼𝛼2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌� � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�) + 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1+
𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
2
𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�
�
  . 
The negative root  𝛼𝛼1 does not make economic sense.  We then have 
(a)  𝛼𝛼1 < 0  and 𝛼𝛼2 < 0.  Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂  
(b)  𝛼𝛼1 < 0  and 0 <  𝛼𝛼2 <  1 .  Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼2   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 <  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂  
 For  𝛼𝛼2 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 
(c) 𝛼𝛼1 < 0  and 0 < 1 <  𝛼𝛼2 .  Then    
 For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 >  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates these cases. 
 
(iii)  In the case where income and preferences for the public good are independent of each 
other,  𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 = 0 , so that (17) yields 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼�)� > (<) 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < (>) 𝛼𝛼� .  (20) 
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That is, taxpayers with a public good taste smaller than the mean  𝛼𝛼�  lose in the counterfactual 
relative to OT. 
 Figure 3 shows graphically what is involved when 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 = 0 and we count as coerced only 
those who lose relative to the Lindahl counterfactual. The difference between utility under the 
counterfactual, Lindahl-like solution and the optimal tax one is drawn against the intensity of taste 
for the public good from lower to higher.  Coercion is highest when the taste for 𝐺𝐺 takes its lowest 
value 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚, and declines thereafter up to a threshold value 𝛼𝛼�. For individuals with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 >  𝛼𝛼�, utility 
under the OT planner rises as their taste for the public good increases.  
 
Figure 3. Coercion in OT when income and taste for the public good 
are independent of each other (𝝈𝝈𝜶𝜶𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐  = 0).  Coercion = VLi  – VOi > 0. 
ViL – ViO
αm
α
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4.2 Coercion in an electoral equilibrium 
Working as before, we obtain 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ) + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 � .   (21) 
As with equation (17), the sign of (21) is ambiguous and depends on  𝛼𝛼� relative to 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, the sign 
of 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the public good, as well as the 
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correlation between political influence and taste for the public good, 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 . With each one of  𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2  and  𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2  taking positive, zero and negative values, we have a total combination of nine 
possible constellations, each one leading to a number of sub-cases. So to go forward, we simplify 
further.  
 If it is plausible that the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good, we 
have 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 < 0 . If it is further assumed that those with a high taste for 𝐺𝐺 are also politically more 
influential - that is, that the poor have greater influence than the rich, then 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 > 0 . We then have  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ) < 0 and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 � < 0. Using the latter, the expression in (21) yields a 
quadratic equation similar to (18′) and a similar range of solutions.  
 On the other hand, if the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good and 
they are also politically more influential or, equivalently, those with low taste for the public good 
are more influential, so that 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 < 0 , expression (21) yields the quadratic equation  
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2 − �1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ) − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 ��𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 )    (22) 
The roots of (22) are  
 𝛼𝛼1 =  𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛� 𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1−𝛼𝛼�−𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ) − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 � and   
 𝛼𝛼2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛� 𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1−𝛼𝛼�−𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 � . 
For concreteness we assume  𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛� 𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2𝑌𝑌�𝑌𝑌�+𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1−𝛼𝛼�−𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌
2 �
> 0 and (1 − 𝛼𝛼� − 𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 ) > 0 . A total of six cases are 
then possible as described below: 
(i.a) 0 <  𝛼𝛼2 < 1 and 𝛼𝛼1 < 0 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼2  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 < 0    
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For  𝛼𝛼2 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0 
(i.b) 0 <  𝛼𝛼2 < 1 and 0 < 𝛼𝛼1 < 1 . Then  
 For  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙[𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2]  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0    
For  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∈ [𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2]  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 < 0    
For 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙[𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2] ⟹  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0    
 (i.c) 0 <  𝛼𝛼2 < 1 and 𝛼𝛼1 > 1 . Then 
 For 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼2  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0    
For  𝛼𝛼2 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 < 0 
(ii.a) 𝛼𝛼2 < 0  and 𝛼𝛼1 < 0 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0    
(ii.b) 𝛼𝛼2 < 0  and 0 < 𝛼𝛼1 < 1 . Then  
 For  0 <  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼1   ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 < 0    
For  𝛼𝛼1 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 0     
(ii.c)  𝛼𝛼2 < 0 and 𝛼𝛼1 > 1 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 < 0 .   
 
4.3  A comparison of OT and electoral equilibrium 
Finally we compare coercion with the OT solution and in an electoral equilibrium by considering 
the welfare differentials (17) and (21). We might expect coercion under a social planner to always 
exceed that in the electoral equilibrium, because the social planner is allowed to coerce anyone to 
any extent, as a matter of social solidarity, as long as social welfare increases.  
 However, this generalization does not hold in our simple model. After substituting from 
(17) and (21) and manipulating, we see that if  𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼2 > (<) 0 , when 
  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)−𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1−𝛼𝛼�−𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(1−𝛼𝛼�)−𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�1−𝛼𝛼�−𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �+𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�𝛼𝛼�+𝑁𝑁𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑌𝑌2 �−𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝛼𝛼�      
it is the case that  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 < (>) 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 .  So coercion for an individual under the social 
planner may be lower or higher than in our democracy. Of course  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  when 
𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼
2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑌𝑌𝛼𝛼2 = 0.  
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4.  Concluding remarks  
Social interaction necessarily requires limits on individual choices. As soon as we are part of a 
group, various opinions must be heard and compromises must be made. Difficult questions will 
inevitably arise about how limits to individual actions are to be determined, how such limits or 
rights are to be defined, and how they will be enforced once agreement on their nature is achieved. 
Coercion of the individual by the group is an inevitable outcome of our struggle to deal with these 
issues.    
 Although coercion is therefore essential to, and plays a key role in the Calculus of Consent, 
it has not been well-defined or studied extensively in economics. A careful definition requires the 
use of a counterfactual, non-coercive social state against which the coercion inherent in any 
particular situation is to be judged. We have outlined three different approaches to the choice of a 
counterfactual in the fiscal context: the individual-as-dictator, in which the counterfactual is what 
the individual would want if they alone decided everything; the individual-in-society, in which the 
counterfactual is what the individual would like to pay (or, to have in public services) taking as 
given the socially determined level of public goods (the socially determined tax rate they must 
pay); and the individual-as-planner counterfactual, which we have tentatively explored in this 
chapter. In the individual-as-planner approach, in contrast to the other approaches, all 
counterfactual positions are explicitly required to be mutually consistent. The Lindahl solution 
serves as one obvious choice for such a counterfactual, and it is the one that we have employed in 
our preliminary investigation.   
 Our analysis of the individual-as-planner approach to coercion has led to somewhat 
complex results about the nature of fiscal coercion. In the OT solution, if we treat only those who 
lose relative to the counterfactual as being coerced, the extent of coercion depends entirely on the 
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nature of an individual's taste for the public good relative to a critical threshold that depends on 
average tastes, average income and the correlation of tastes and income. The sign of the correlation 
of income and tastes determines how low or high taste citizens fare relative to the counterfactual. 
In the electoral equilibrium, there is also a critical level that can be compared to an individual's 
taste for public goods to determine the nature of coercion, but now (and not surprisingly) the 
threshold taste level depends on the correlation of income and political influence as well as the 
correlation of income and tastes.  
 Some statements can be made about the comparative nature of coercion in OT and in the 
electoral equilibrium; in particular, it is not the case that the (coercion-unconstrained) social 
planner will always impose more coercion than occurs in the electoral equilibrium. But simple 
general rules about what does happen do not seem possible even in the stripped down model we 
have explored. Perhaps others can find sensible assumptions that lead to more definite results. 
 The analysis we have conducted is subject to two fundamental assumptions: that the power 
of the state is suitably restrained; and that exit from the community is prohibitively expensive. In 
addition, we have assumed that income is determined independently of the fiscal system. A full 
analysis of coercion in public finance and, in this respect, of the calculus of consent, awaits a more 
complete analysis that relaxes these assumptions while deriving general propositions about 
coercion that are relevant to modern fiscal systems.  
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